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Let me begin by presenting a couple of examples of
the confusions to which I refer. First, in a widely read
article, Katie McCabe, a journalist, makes a seemingly
innocuous attribution: "Singer argues that all sentient
beings have equal moral status "1 Once equal moral
status and equal consideration are distinguished, given
a general familiarity with Singer's work, it becomes
clear that this attribution is false, or at least very
uncertain-though Singer unequivocally argues for
equal consideration.
These words from philosopher Carl Cohen will serve
as a starting point for disentangling these concepts
(providing a second example):
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I. Introduction
Passions tend to run high in ethical debates
concerning animals, not only among laypersons and in
political arenas, but also in the nonnally cool chambers
of academic philosophy. Objectivity and care, though
indispensable for understanding differing positions and
their supporting arguments, often seem in short supply.
As a result, distinct issues are confused while
arguments are misunderstood and then misrepresented
in counterarguments.
This essay concerns two normative concepts whose
conflation in animal ethics debates easily leads to
intellectual mischief: (1) equality in moral status, and
(2) one's interests' having moral weight equal to the
identical interests of others. (2), which is difficult to
fonnulate precisely without awkwardness, might also
be put in this way: one's interests' deserving equal
consideration to the identical interests ofothers. After
distinguishing and clarifying these concepts, I present
a preliminary case for the thesis that animals are unequal
in moral status-though their interests should be given
equal consideration. In making my case I note some
general implications for the use of nonhuman animals
(hereafter, simply "animals") in research.
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The first error [of animal activists] is the
assumption, often explicitly defended, that all
sentient animals have equal moral status· 2
Between a dog and a human being, according
to this view, there is no moral difference; hence
the pains suffered by dogs must be weighed no
differently from the pains suffered by hwnans.3
Here Cohen confud these two claims: (1) that two
individuals, say a human and a chicken, have equal
moral standing or status (to be defmed below), and (2)
that an interest had by one being, say the interest a
human has in avoiding suffering, has equal moral weight
with the identical interest had by another being, e.g.,
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the chicken. Let us first elucidate the simpler notion of
the equal consideration of interests.

W;7 Clearly a great deal of weight falls on what counts
as "relevantly similar... Or-since another way to state
the principle ofuniversalizability is to say that, for A to
make two incompatible judgments in two different
cases, the second case must bear a relevant difference
from the frrst-the weight may be seen to fallon what
counts as a "relevant difference."
Therefore, while it cannot be stated dogmatically that
the concept of morality includes the requirement that
all identical interests count equally (as Singer and Hare
would have it), given the principle of universalizability,

II. Equal Consideration or Identical Interests
I begin with two premises that I will not defend in
this essay: (1) some animals have interests,S and (2)
their interests have some moral weight. Given this, we
must consider whether identical interests count equally,
i.e., whether they have equal moral weight. The
principle of equal consideration of interests (''principle
of equal consideration," for short) says that they do.
Obviously, this issue is of the utmost importance for
animal ethics. If the interest that, say, a cat has in X
(where X is a particular object of an interest, e.g.,
freedom) does not have as much moral weight as the
interest a human has in X, perhaps it has very little
weight. If all animal interests had very little weight
compared to the identical interests of humans, this
would vindicate the ways animals have traditionally
been regarded in our society. But if the principle of
equal consideration is true (or otherwise worthy of
acceptance), then, obviously, many of our animalexploiting institutions are morally unjustified.
It has been argued by a number of philosophers,
including Singer and Hare, that equal consideration is
a formal requirement of morality or, in other words,
that the concept of morality, or the logic of moral
language, includes this requirement.6 This is almost
certainly false. Would a putatively moral system that
stipulated that the interests ofeveryone counted equally,
except for Jesus', which counted twice as much as the
others, for that reason fail to be a moral system? On
the other hand, not counting identical interests equally
seems in need of justification. It is appropriate to ask
why so-and-so's interests should count more than those
of others. If the interests one being has in X do not
have the same moral weight as the interests another
being has in X, there must be a morally relevant
difference between them.
This is a consequence of the principle of universalizability. I assume a formulation of this principle
that I think least contentious and clearly reasonable as
a constraint on moral reasoning: If A judges that P in
circumstances C, A must judge that P in relevantly
similar circumstances (ones relevantly similar to C).
This principle has the following implication: IfAjudges
that the interests ofbeing B have weight W; A mustjudge

the onus ofprooffalls on the inegalitarian,jor she must
identify the relevant difference between the two beings
that justifies making different moral judgments with
respect to them.

m.

Let us tum now to equal moral status, a somewhat
vague but commonly employed notion. A and B have

equal moral status, in the relevant sense, if and only if
they deserve equal treatment-in a particular sense of
equal" that is difficult to define butfairly easy to grasp
through examples. First, let us elucidate equal treatment
II

with an example. It might be said that dogs deserve dog
food while cats deserve cat food. To give dogs and cats
the food they deserve is to treat them unequally in one
sense because it is to give them different kinds of food,
but this is not the sense I am after. In the relevant sense,
to give cats cat food and dogs dog food is to treat them
equally because it is in their interests to be fed food
appropriate for their species, and to feed them in this way
is to affect the only interest at stake equally. It is
compatible with the claim that dogs and cats have equal
moral standing to judge that dogs deserve dog food and
cats deserve cat food. It is not compatible with this claim
to judge that dogs deserve dog food and cats deserve no
food, for this judgment implies that the two creatures
deserve unequal treatment (in the relevant sense).
If two beings have equal moral status if and only if
they deserve equal treatment, what is moral status itself?

Moral status is the degree (relative to other beings) of
moral resistance to having one's interest:r-especially
one's most important interests--thwarted. Suppose that
whenever it is morally imperative that either A or B
die, suffer, endure a severe restriction of freedom, or
have some other important interest thwarted, it is A
whose interests, morally, should be thwarted. Then B
has greater moral status than A, because the moral

that the interests ofbeings relevantly similar to B have
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resistance ofB 's most important interests against being
thwarted, is greater than that of A's interests. The
imaginary case of A and B would be a very clear
example of one being's having greater moral status
than another.
But for two beings to differ in moral status, it need
not be the case that one's interests always have stronger
moral resistance to being thwarted than another's. I
am convinced that actual differences in moral status
are more subtle than that. But even if two beings'
interests have equal moral resistance to being thwarted,
except for one very important interest-with respect
to which one's interest is always (or almost always)
rightly sacrificed instead of the other's identical
interest-it is correct to say that they differ in moral
status (to that degree).
The essential idea is simply this: If we consider a
broad range of cases in which the important interests
of either A or B must (morally) be thwarted, and A loses
out in some of these cases but B does not (or rarely
does), then A is more sacrijiceable in an important
sense-in this sense A has lower moral status. As an
illustration, we tend to think that trout have lower moral
status than humans; we tend to believe that there are
cases in which it would be right to sacrifice interests
(e.g., life, freedom, experiential welfare8) of one rather
than the other, and that it is usually or always the trout's
interests that are rightly sacrificed.

Let us look at these in tum to see if differences in moral
status appear with respect to any of them.
First. I believe that there are insufficient grounds
for arguing that equal consideration of experiential
welfare interests reveals differences in moral status. The
picture is complicated. In the light of certain factors,
equal consideration seems to favor, for example,
performing painful experiments on a cat as opposed to
a human (if either is to be used and the human does not
volunteer): The suffering caused to humans who are
terrified about being conscripted for the research, the
humans' anticipatory dread if they are kidnapped, and
so on-none of which a cat would experience. At the
same time, other considerations seem to favor using a
human. For example, the fact that an experiment will
last only a few days and will not involve killing research
subjects (ifthat is the case) can be explained to a human,
not to a cat. so that a cat might suffer more fright during
the research. 12 In the light of such mixed considerations
I am unprepared to assert that differences in moral status
appear with respect to experiential welfare.
However, I think that differences in moral status do
begin to appear when we consider the interest of
freedom. Because external constraints thwart an
individual's freedom-interest by preventing her from
doing what she wants, it may be said that they thwart
this interest to the extent that they prevent her from
doing what she wants. And this is a function of the

Iv. Equal Consideration and Unequal Moral Status

The point is that, if, e.g., a dog and a human were kept
captive for a number of days for the purposes of an
experiment. no matter how humanely they were treated,
such captivity would generally (not always) do more
violence to a human's plans than it would to the totality
of things the dog would want to dO. 13 I ask the sceptical
reader to consider all the things she wants to do in the
next, say, five days and where she would have to go to
do them. This gives us, generally, one reason-which,
to my knowledge, has been overlooked until now-for
preferring the use of animals over humans in (freedomrestricting) research. 14
Differences in moral status appear most vividly, I
think, with respect to life, but this is also the interest
about which it is most difficult to say anything with
certainty.IS A good way to start the analysis is to ask
why death is a harm, or, equivalently, why life is
valuable. People seem to use different language to
describe the same intuitive idea. R. G. Frey holds that
life is valuable because of its riches and that the value

range and nature of things an individual wants to do.

I will now argue that, even if the principle of equal
consideration is true, there is good reason to believe
that animals differ in moral status. (A successful
argument will, of course, show that the two concepts
are distinct.) I begin with the assumption that there are
no arguments that meet the onus of proof-established
by the principle of universalizability-on the person
who denies the principle of equal consideration. This
assumption notwithstanding, I think an examination of
interests shared by animals and humans suggests that
humans have greater moral status than animals.
(Assume from now on that by "humans" I mean normal
adult humans.)9
In my view animals (that have interests at all) share
these three fundamental objects of interests with
humans: {l) a favorable experiential welfare lo; (2) the
freedom (lack of external constraints) necessary to do
what they desire to do; and (3) life or remaining alive. ll
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of a given life is afunction of its riches. For this reason
he thinks that human life-which is characterized by
deep personal relations, enjoyments of myriad kinds
from hedonistic ones to the most refined, and
autonomously pursuing lifeplans-simply overwhelms
in value the life of an animal. 16 Tom Regan argues that
death is a harm because it forecloses all opportunities
an individual has for obtaining the satisfactions
available to members of one's species, and more
opportunities are closed off in the case of a human than
in the case of a dog. 1? I make essentially the same point
as Frey and Regan by asserting that the death of a human
thwarts more interests, and more very important or
centrai18 interests, than the death of an animal, so that
the former is the greater harm. 19 It really is difficult to
believe that the painless killing of a human is not
normally more destructive of something objectively
valuable than the painless killing of an animal. This
intuition persists, I think, even when we consider the
fact that whatever a hamster's life involves is all the
hamster has.
If the preceding reflections are sound, differences
in moral status appear with respect to life-interests.
Applying the principle of equal consideration, it is
worse, other things being equal, to kill a human than to
kill an animal. That gives us one good reason to prefer
the use of animals over humans in experiments that
result in the research subject's death, if such experiments
are to be done at all. Thus, in freedom-restricting
research that ends in the subject's death, there are two
prima facie reasons to prefer the use of animals over
humans: giving identical interests equal weight, a
particular restriction of freedom is generally more
harmful to humans than to nonhumans, while death is
similarly a greater harm, in most cases, to humans than
to nonhumans. If this is right, then animals are, after
all, somewhat more sacrificeable than humans, though
it may be that there are very few cases in which anyone's
interests may justifiably be thwarted in research. 2o In
this light, we may acknowledge that there are
differences in moral status between humans and
nonhumans (and, no doubt, among different animals).
The crucial point to recognize is that this thesis is
perfectly compatible with the principle of equal
consideration.
As a concluding comment, those unsympathetic to
the animal welfare movement had better get straight
which thesis they are auaeking. If they are attacking
the principle of equal consideration, they have a
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substantial burden ofproof to meet; if they are attacking
the thesis that all animals (that have interests) have equal
moral status, their target is made of straw. If, like Cohen,
they are attacking both theses simultaneously without
distinguishing them, they are confused and are lowering
the quality of animal ethics debates.

Notes
1 "Who WIll Live, Who WIll Die?," The Washingtonian
(August 1986, vol. 21, no. II).
2 For the record, I know of no philosopher who explicitly
defends this thesis.
3 "The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical
Research," The New England Journal of Medicine 315, no.
14 (Oct. 2, 1986), p. 867.

4 He either identifies these two claims or thinks that first
entails the second. Either way, there is a misunderstanding.

5 I will not develop an analysis of "interest" here, though
I give this topic extensive treatment in my dissertation,
"Interests, Intuition, and Moral Status" (Georgetown
University, not yet printed). For the purposes of this essay,
let us assume that Regan's analysis into preference-interests
and welfare-interests is roughly correct. So when I assert
that an animal has a given interest, it may be assumed that I
think it falls under one or both of these categories.
6 Singer makes this argument in Practical Ethics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 10-11.

7 I assume that A judges that the weight of a being's
interests remains constant over time. Thus the "circumstances" relevant here. the only ones that might change from
one case to the other, are what beings are under consideration.
So a relevant difference would be a difference between
the beings.
8 I believe the claim that trout have these interests can be
defended with a combination of philosophical and empirical
arguments. (I argue for the thesis that all vertebrates have
these interests in ch. 4 ofmy dissertation, "Interests, Intuition,
and Moral Status.") Anyone who is sceptical might substitute
the "lowest" animal she believes capable of suffering, who at
least will be believed to have experiential welfare interests.
I suspect the conclusion will remain plausible after the
substitution.

9 I also think differences in moral status exist among
(nonhuman) animals, but, for reasons of space, I will not
defend this thesis.
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10 This is meant to include not having a very bad
experiential welfare, so that "a favorable experiential welfare"
includes the avoidance of great suffering-aIthough this is
sometimes possible only by way of death.

concern what we want, while the latter concern what we need.
An interest, then, is central to the extent that it figures
prominently in the total system of what we want and need.
My desire to become a contributing philosopher is very central
to my overall plans; my desire to have grapefruit juice when
I get home is not. My need for food in the next week is very
central; my need for a lot of exercise in the same time period
is less so.

11 Obviously, as note 10 suggests, this last interest can be
extinguished in certain circumstances, for instance, when
remaining alive entails intense and prolonged suffering. Less
obviously, freedom and experiential welfare can, under
pressure, give way as interests. External constraints may be
needed for protection from death, injury, or other harm, while
suffering may have to be endured to stay alive or to retain
one's freedom.

19 By "harm" I mean a thwarting of interests.
20 Even if, as Regan thinks, we must not use animals or
humans (who have not consented) in research at all, there
will still be some tragic circumstances outside the research
setting-like Regan's own lifeboat cases-in which certain
individuals who would be killed anyway may be killed so
that not all will die (The Case for Animal Rights, pp. 286294). Even Regan implicitly accommodates the idea that there
are differences in moral status; he just tightly restricts the
kinds of cases where sacrifices are to be permitted.

12 Both kinds ofconsideration are noted by Singer, Animal
Liberation (New York: New York Review: distributed by

Random House, 1975), pp. 17-18.
13 This is only generally true because some humans (e.g.,
the very old, the retarded) do not always have plans that are
so badly thwarted by captivity, while some animals (e.g., birds)
may be almost completely frustrated, in terms of what they
want to do, by captivity.

s.o.s.

14 Of course, the research we are primarily, if not
exclusively, concerned with is freedom-restricting. (Research
that does not restrict freedom includes field research and
statistical studies based on already obtained data.)
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subject is. In other words, suffering is suffering.

1M 10 ... ~'-oIW"'9lramn.~for
Anirnolo Fa.nclaIion, pradudon
o-a-.;,.,," Animals'Voic.
~ilo 1m I-; upnlocl io... . . "'9. . . . .b.s
,ailOlho........, r..ndi 10 rwI-u. ... '::;;:"~Ift ill dodicolod
olIort 10 oid Iho,oloomh of "'m!'9'!"~ !he ~ for
Animals fu.eldotion ..I m,*", dolor lor dolor, 011 ~.
donoticn ~ ,......... "" ""'9""ilo'. bohoIf. If)"U -Ad 11.10 _
Th.Animoll' VOice~'" po_, f!lOcao....t,.... .....
cIo<i.dblo donofion: n.
. for AnimcM ~, 10 Bo.
:U1W, IDI~., CA

:U, If>Kifyinlllhot~uwanl a I<>

go di-=tIy inl<> Ih• ..-cu. 01 Ih. mollClZlno. Wilh )"!'" help,
Ih. magazine wiN ,.....in the ""'CO 0I1ho .... CoIe..

16"Animal Parts, Human Wholes: On the Use ofAnimals
as a Source of Organs for Human Transplants," Biomedical
Ethics Reviews 1987, eel. James M. Humber and Robert F.
Almeder (Clifton, New Jersey: Humana Press, 1987).

17 The

John J. Loeper
CRUSADE FOR KINDNESS
Henry Bergh and the ASPCA
New York: Atheneum, 1991
98p, bibliography, index
$12.95 hardcover

Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of
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